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And I Will Try to Fix You: A Study of Heterogeneity in Job 
Satisfaction with Implications for Flexible Employment Contracts 
 
This paper is an empirical study of slope heterogeneity in job satisfaction. It provides 
evidence from the generalized ordered probit models that different job characteristics tend to 
have different distributional impacts on the overall job satisfaction. For instance, standard 
models tend to significantly underestimate the effects of monthly salary and hours worked at 
generating the “highly” satisfied workers, whilst lowering the incidence of the “very 
dissatisfied” workers. Although our results should be viewed as illustrative, we provide 
discussions of their potential implications for employers and they could help with the design 
of employment contracts. 
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Research on job satisfaction as a determinant of objective economic behaviours has often 
neglected to report one particular result that, in the study of employer–employee relations, is 
potentially very valuable. This is, to quote the seminal work by Richard B. Freeman (1978, 
p. 135), whether “when [job] satisfaction is an independent variable, the set of dummies has 
an a priori ordering of effects with, for example, the third category having a larger effect than 
the second (relative to, say, the first) and the fourth a larger effect than the third”. Most 
studies simply assume cardinality in the subjective data – i.e., that the difference between 
job-satisfaction scores of “1” and “2” is the same as that between “3” and “4” – and choose to 
report only the “average” predictive impact of job satisfaction on behaviours such as actual 
quits and intentions to quit (see, e.g., Freeman, 1978; Clark, 2001; Lévy-Garboua et al, 2007; 
Böckerman  &  Ilmakunnas,  2009).  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  very  few  studies  have 
provided evidence that there is indeed a strict ordering effect of job satisfaction in equations 
where an objective economic behaviour is the dependent variable. For example, in a study by 
Shields and Wards (2001) on nurse retention in the National Health Service in England, those 
individuals who reported to be “very dissatisfied” with their job overall are 65% more likely 
to  hold  intentions  to  quit  than  those  reporting  to  be  “satisfied”,  with  the  probability  of 
intending to quit decreasing monotonically with successively higher job satisfaction and with 
each being statistically significantly different from each other.
2    
Why should we care about the evidence of an ordering effect of job satisfaction? First, 
such evidence lends supp ort to the idea that the measurement of job satisfaction is not 
significantly dominated by white noises (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001), i.e., people really 
and categorically mean what they say. It also implies ordinal comparability across job -
                                                           
2 Those reporting to be “dissatisfied” and “neither satisfied or dissatisfied” with their job overall are respectively 
53% and 32% more likely than the “very satisfied” group to hold intentions to quit.  3 
 
satisfaction  responses,  which,  in  other  words,  suggests  that  employees  share  a  common 
opinion of what job satisfaction is and have a common understanding of how to translate 
inner feelings into a number scale that is, more or less, interpreted in the same way across all 
individuals (see Van Praag, 1991). Second, provided that each successive category on the 
job-satisfaction  scale  matters  and  statistically  significantly  differs,  there  is  an  additional 
incentive from the employer’s point of view to utilize the findings on the determinants of job 
satisfaction and to create, perhaps at the lowest cost possible, a working environment that 
promotes their employees not only to be happier at work, but also to be (and confidentially 
reporting to be) among those highly “satisfied” with their job overall.  
This seems possible in theory, but how feasible is it in practice, and how reliable are 
the results reported in the current literature? As it stands, there are at least two main and 
relatively  unresolved  problems  associated  with  the  findings  on  determinants  of  job 
satisfaction. The first is the well-known issue of causality (or how different job characteristics 
are causally linked with job satisfaction). The second, which forms the focus of this paper, is 
the issue of heterogeneity in job satisfaction.   
Most  empirical  work  on  the  determinants  of  job  satisfaction  uses  either  linear 
regression  or  single-index  ordered  probit  and  logit  models.  While  the  latter  account  for 
discreteness and ordering of job satisfaction, they impose an implicit cardinalization such 
that, for  example, the trade-off ratios  between income and work hours  must be constant 
across the distribution of job satisfaction (see, e.g., Boes & Winkelmann, 2006). For example, 
if an increase in salary of 2% is required on average to offset a fall in overall job satisfaction 
from an increase in the number of work hours by 1%, then this trade-off ratio is assumed to 
remain constant across different parts of the job-satisfaction distribution. In other words, the 
standard ordered probit and logit models do not allow for the potential heterogeneous effects 
that income and work hours could have on the little-satisfied group as opposed to the highly 4 
 
satisfied  group,  thus  discounting  any  possibilities  of  shortcuts  to  achieving  the  highest 
incidence of highly satisfied workers without having to make large sacrifices in other areas in 
return. 
Recent econometric evidence, however, suggests that the implicit cardinalization of 
subjective well-being data may be too strong. For instance, Boes and Winkelmann (2010) 
have  shown  that  income  significantly  reduces  the  incidence  of  people  reporting  low 
satisfaction  with  life  overall  but  does  not  increase  the  incidence  of  high  life  satisfaction 
among men in Germany. Mentzakis (2011) also reports a considerable heterogeneity in the 
compensation variation for different types of health problems across different parts of the 
life-satisfaction  distribution.  Despite  finding  statistically  insignificant  average  effect  of 
grandparenthood  on  life  satisfaction,  Powdthavee  (2011)  shows  that  being  a  grandparent 
increases the probability of individuals reporting to be “very satisfied” with life overall. In 
short, there is increasing empirical evidence from studies that use less restrictive models that 
heterogeneity in subjective data matters in terms of what inferences we can draw from the 
estimation results.  
Our paper follows the recent literature and explores what happens if the effects of 
many  of  the  studied  job  characteristics  such  as  incomes,  work  hours,  and  promotional 
opportunity are in fact different in different parts of the job-satisfaction distribution. What 
lessons can we learn from this, and what implications might this have on the employer–
employee  relations  literature?  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  empirical  evidence  on  the 
heterogeneous  effect  of  job  characteristics  on  different  parts  of  the  job-satisfaction 
distribution is scarce, and discussions on the implications of such evidence are virtually non-
existent. For this reason, our paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. 5 
 
The remainder of this paper can be structured as follows. Section 2 reports our data 
set and presents descriptive statistics of our main variables. Section 3 develops our empirical 
strategy based on the generalized probit model and attempts to account for potential selection 
biases. Empirical results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The data set comes from Waves 1–18 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is 
a  multi-purpose  study  and  a  nationally  representative  sample  of  British  households, 
containing over 15,000 adult individuals across UK. The survey has been conducted between 
September and Christmas of each year from 1991 to 2010, and is available for download 
from the UK Data Archive (www.data-archive.ac.uk). 
From  Wave  1  onward,  individuals  are  asked  to  rate  in  confidence  their  levels  of 
satisfaction with their jobs overall. Responses are given on a seven-point scale, ranging from 
1 “very dissatisfied” to 7 “very satisfied”. We focus our attention on individuals of working 
age (16–65) in full-time employment and working in the private sector,
3 as well as the self-
employed, who also reported a level of job satisfaction in any given wave. This produces a 
nationally  representative  sample  of  76,05 3  observations  (15,674  individuals).  Of  those, 
34,756 observations (7,696 individuals) are women, 41,297 (7,978 individuals) are men. 
Approximately 63% of the full sample are age 40  or under. The average salary is £1,497.88 
per month, and the average number of hours worked is 34.19 per week. Most individuals are 
in a permanent job (97%); around 34% are in a job with a promotional opportunity; 17%  are 
                                                           
3  It  is  possible  that  the  determinants  of  job  satisfaction  differ  between  public  and  private  sector  workers. 
However,  since  we  do  not  aim  to  distinguish  between  the  two,  and  for  simplicity  and  relevance  with  the 
previous literature, we have decided to focus our attention in the current study only on those workers in the 
private sector. 6 
 
union members; and almost 25% have to make a (one way) journey of more than 30 minutes 
to work every day. Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this paper’s analysis 
can also be found in Table 1A in the Appendix. 
Most people seem to be “highly” (to “very”) satisfied with their job; approximately 
44% of the British private and self-employed workers report a “6” on the seven-point job-
satisfaction scale, while 13% report to be “very satisfied” with their jobs overall (see the 
distribution of self-reported overall job satisfaction in Figure 1).  
 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1.  Standard and generalized ordered probit 
The standard ordered probit model typically used in the estimation of job satisfaction can be 
formally written as follows: 
) ( Φ ) ( Φ ) Pr( θ X ω θ X ω X j JS it j it j it it      1   1 ,..., 1   J j      (1) 
where  n i ,..., 1  . The dependent variable    J JSi ,..., 1   represents a self-reported level in 
response to an overall job-satisfaction question for individual  n i ,..., 1   at time  T t ,..., 1  ; 
j   denotes the threshold values, where  1 1  J ω ω ,..., ;   is a vector of parameter estimates; and 
) (   denotes the cumulative density function (CDF) in which the variance, without loss of 
generality, is normalized to unity. The vector of explanatory variables, X, includes log of pay 
per month (in real terms), job tenure, job tenure squared, log of work hours per week, size of 
the workplace, a dummy representing whether the job is permanent or temporary, dummies 
for commuting time to work, union membership, opportunity for employment to work, and a 
dummy representing whether there is  a pension scheme at the workplace, as well as the 7 
 
respondent’s non-work variables, which are age, age squared, gender, health status, marital 
status, education, race dummies, occupational sector dummies, regional dummies, and wave 
dummies.  Since  it  holds  that    1    and    1 J  ,  then 0 1   ) ( Φ θ X ω it ;  and 
1 1    ) ( Φ θ X ω it J . As usual, the maximum -likelihood procedure is employed to estimate 
the vector of parameter estimates,  , along with  j   in the job-satisfaction equation (1). 
However, this conventional approach implicitly imposes a rather strong assumption 
that the job-satisfaction trade-off is homogenous across the distribution of outcomes, and, if 
the trade-off heterogeneity exists, may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates (Mentzakis, 
2011; Boes & Winkelmann, 2010). Since our key interest zeroes in on sensitivity with respect 
to the levels of job satisfaction, we opt for a more flexible framework of the generalized 
ordered  probit  estimation,  where  the  effects  of  income  and  other  characteristics  across 
different levels of job satisfaction are unrestricted. The generalized setting can be written as: 
it j it it u θ X JS  
* ;           (2) 
j JSit   if  ij it ij JS     
*
1  for  J j ,..., 1  ,       (3) 
where 
*
it JS   is  the  (unobserved)  latent  variable  of  job  satisfaction  associated  with  the 
(observed)  response  outcomes,  it JS ;  and  j it j ij X      .  Heterogeneity  enters  the 
generalized ordered model in (2) and (3) in such a way that the threshold values,  ij  , are 
allowed to be a linear function of regressors,  it X , making the vector of parameter estimates, 
j  , and thus the marginal effects on satisfaction category-specific. The generalized ordered 
probit model can be depicted as: 
) ( Φ ) ( Φ ) Pr( 1 1        j it j j it j it it θ X ω θ X ω X j JS ,     (4) 8 
 
where  j j      . In addition, a well-defined likelihood requires that the order restriction is 
satisfied. That is,  1 1      j it j j it j θ X ω θ X ω , for all i and  j .  
In  the  generalized  ordered  probit,  the  marginal  probability  effects  of  independent 
variables on job satisfaction are heterogeneous across different levels of satisfaction. In other 
words, the standard ordered probit model is nested in the generalized model (4) through the 
constraint  J    ... 1   (Boes  &  Winkelmann,  2004).  Therefore,  additional  flexibility 
provided by relaxation of this restriction in the generalized model illuminates clearer insights 
into the satisfaction trade-off as the marginal probability effects run from the lowest to the 
highest job satisfaction.
4 In panel data, equation (4) can be generalized further to allow for 
individual-specific random effects,  , i μ  
), ( Φ ) ( Φ ) , Pr( i j it j i j it j i it it μ θ X ω μ θ X ω μ X j JS          1 1     (5) 
where  it i X μ COV , ( ) is assumed to be 0. In cases where the assumption of no correlation 
between  i μ  and  it X  is violated, it is possible to follow the idea of Chamberlain (1980) under 
a Mundlak (1978) restriction to allow for possible correlation between  i μ  and  it X  as follows: 
, i i i α X μ               (6) 
where  i X  is the average of  it X  over time (see also: Boes & Winkelmann, 2010; Mentzakis, 
2011).  
3.2.  Accounting for selection bias 
                                                           
4 As Boes and Winkelmann (2004) highlight, the additional flexibility that the generalized ordered probit model 
offers does not come without costs. Now that the order restrictions have to be satisfied, computation of the 
generalized ordered probit estimates tends to be considerably tedious. 9 
 
We acknowledge that there may be some selection bias into full-time employment and self-
employment for those who are more satisfied at work (see, e.g., Heckman, 1979). In order to 
account for this, we compute an inverse Mills ratio using a selection variable that equals 1 if 
the individual is either in full-time employment or self-employed and 0 otherwise. The probit 
model  for  being  employed  is  estimated  on  the  entire  work  and  non-work  samples 
(N = 194,107 observations) and includes all the socio-economic variables specified in X as in 
equation (1), as well as a number of individual and household variables that help to determine 
the probability of employment but are assumed not to influence job satisfaction. These latter 
are  variables  that  identify  the  selection  model.  Following  Clark  (1997),  these  include 
spouse’s pay and spouse’s hours worked and the variables’ interaction with the respondent’s 
gender,  as  well  as  numbers  of  children  in  various  age  groups,  incomes  of  others  in  the 
household, and homeownership status. The estimates for the selection model are reported in 
Table 2A in the Appendix, and the inverse Mills ratio is included as an explanatory variable 
in all equations in the current study. 
 
4.  Estimation results 
3.1.  Pooled cross section 
The  standard  ordered  probit  (OPROBIT)  estimates  and  generalized  ordered  probit 
(GOPROBIT) estimates are presented in Table 1. The set of controls is as stated in equation 
(1).  In  the  generalized  model,  six  parameter  vectors  are  estimated  (where  each  vector 
contains  coefficients  for all the explanatory variables). All  equations  are estimated using 
STATA11.1 with robust standard errors and clustering by personal identification. 
While we cannot interpret the estimated coefficients from either model directly, as the 
marginal effects of job characteristics on overall job satisfaction will be derived later, the 
comparisons of parameter estimates are useful for understanding our ensuing results. For 10 
 
example, if we were to focus our attention on the log of real-pay-per-month coefficients, we 
can see that they are twice or nearly twice as large for the parameters  1   to  4  , and slightly 
larger  for  5  ,  than  the  overall  estimate  in  the  standard  model.  The  estimate becomes 
statistically insignificant for the parameter  6  . A similar pattern of decreasing point estimates 
as we move up the parameters from  1   to  6   is also observed for the estimated coefficients 
on log of hours worked per week and promotion opportunity. However, this does not apply to 
all variables; for instance, with respect to the workplace size of 500+ employees, most of the 
parameters are only slightly different from the point estimate obtained in the standard model. 
A Wald test on the generalized ordered probit model against the standard model also suggests 
that  we  can  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  equal slope  parameters  ( 19 . 924 , 3
2
395   ).  In 
addition,  the  null  hypothesis  of  equal  coefficients  can  be  rejected  for  11  out  of  16  job-
characteristics variables (we can accept the null of equal slopes for the following variables: 
workplace pension; commute: 16–30 minutes; commute: 31–60 minutes; commute: 61–90 
minutes; and self-employed). Hence, the results provide some of the preliminary evidence 
that  job-characteristics  parameters  are  heterogeneous  with  respect  to  the  job-satisfaction 
distribution; in other words, there is slope heterogeneity in the job-satisfaction estimates. It is 
also worth noting that parameters of the inverse Mill’s ratio are positive and statistically 
significant,  thus  implying  that  there  is  indeed  a  significant  correlation  between  job 
satisfaction and selection into full-time employment (and self-employment). 
 
3.2.  Random effects and Mundlak transformations models 
While cross-section models can provide us with suggestive results, they are considered less 
efficient compared to models that take into account the panel structure of the data set (and in 
some  cases,  cross-section  models  can  be  inconsistent  if  there  is  significant  unobserved 
individual heterogeneity in self-reported job satisfaction). Since the BHPS is a longitudinal 11 
 
data set, it is possible to allow for the individual-specific random effects to be parameterized 
in  the  estimation  of  job  satisfaction.  Following  Boes  and  Winkelmann  (2010),  Table  2 
presents  estimates  taken  from  the  random-effects  generalized  ordered  probit  model  (RE-
GOPROBIT), which allows for the individual differences in job satisfaction to be estimated 
alongside other parameters in the model.  
We  also  provide  in  Table  3  estimates  taken  from  the  random-effects  generalized 
ordered probit model with Mundlak transformations (RE-GOPROBIT-ML). While the RE-
GOPROBIT model accounts  for individual-specific random  effects  in  panel  data sets,  its 
implicit assumption of no individual fixed effects, i.e., zero correlation between unobserved 
individual heterogeneity and the explanatory variables, is often rejected by the data. One 
could imagine, for example, that people who are born with persistent personality traits that 
make them happy with work may be more productive in the labour market and earn higher 
than usual incomes in the process. The effect of these unobserved characteristics may also 
vary across different parts of the job-satisfaction responses. To account for the possibility of 
the omitted time-invariant variables bias, a set of within-person averages – or the long-run 
effects  –  of  the  explanatory  variables  can  be  included  as  additional  controls  in  the  job-
satisfaction equation, that is, simply  i X  of  it X . According to Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), this 
so-called Mundlak transformations model yields similar results on the estimated coefficients 
of interest to other approaches that factor out individual fixed effects from the estimation.
5   
Comparing  the  RE -GOPROBIT  estimates  in  Table  2 ,  the  RE-GOPROBIT-ML 
estimates in Table 3, and the GOPROBIT estimates in Table 1, we can see that, for many of 
the job-characteristics variables, there are little differences  – in terms of size and statistical 
significance – in the point estimates across the three models. For example, the coefficients on 
                                                           
5 For more examples of the Mundlak applications in subjective well-being data, see Mentzakis (2011) and 
Powdthavee and Van Den Berg (2011). 12 
 
the log of real pay per month for parameter  1   are 0.216, 0.264, and 0.237 for GOPROBIT, 
RE-GOPROBIT,  and  RE-GOPROBIT-ML,  respectively.  Nevertheless,  some  of  the 
differences can be seen for parameter  6  ; e.g., the RE-GOPROBIT-ML coefficient on the 
log of real pay per month for parameter  6   is 0.113, which is similar to the 0.107 obtained by 
the standard ordered probit model. By contrast, the equivalent coefficients for GOPROBIT 
and  RE-GOPROBIT  for  parameter  6    are  noticeably  smaller  at  0.008  and  0.031, 
respectively. 
 
4.3. Marginal probability effects and trade-off ratios 
It is tempting to conclude based on the above results that whether or not the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity in the data set is accounted for
6 makes only small differences to the 
point estimates but may result in large differences when one ignores the slope heterogeneity 
in job characteristics in job-satisfaction equations. However, we must first be able to interpret 
the estimated parameters directly and engage in formal comparisons of outcomes across 
models. According to Boes and Winkelmann (2010), there are two ways to interpret the 
standard and generalized ordered probit models. The first is the marginal probability effect 
(MPE) of each job attribute on job satisfaction, and the second  involves the trade-off ratios 
between job characteristics. The former shows how marginal changes in one attribute affect 
the job-satisfaction distribution, while the latter method demonstrates how much one aspect 
of the job has to change in order to compensate for having to go without the other, e.g., how 
much additional income in % is required to compensate an average worker for a 1% increase 
                                                           
6 This is important because, if there really are little differences in the point estimates between GOPROBIT, RE-
GOPROBIT, and RE-GOPROBIT-ML, then researchers can simply estimate GOPROBIT on cross-section data 
without having to worry about potential unobserved heterogeneity bias contaminating their results. 13 
 
in the number of hours worked per week. This differs from the first method as the second 
implicitly responds to the heterogeneous effects of both job attributes simultaneously. 
All of the MPEs are calculated from regression analysis in Tables 1–3. This produces 
fairly dense tables of statistical results. For ease of presentation, we choose to present only 
the estimated MPEs of the following job characteristics in Figures 2A–F: log of pay per 
month; log of hours worked per week; promotion opportunity; commute: 61–90 minutes; 
union membership; and pension scheme.
7  
Looking across the figures, we can see that there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
MPEs across job characteristics. For example, in Figure 2A, the MPE of log of pay per month 
on  the  probability  of  reporting  a  job -satisfaction  score  of  “6”  is  approximately 
(0.002  100 =) 2% when it is estimated using the OPROBIT. By contrast, the equivalent 
MPE is around 6% when we allow for heterogeneity in overall job satisfaction (e.g., see the 
MPEs obtained from the remaining three generalized ordered probit models). With respect to 
the “very satisfied” group, the OPROBIT’s MPE is, again, approximately 2%. On the other 
hand, the MPEs from both GOPROBIT and RE-GOPROBIT are estimated to be slightly less 
than 1% and are statistically insignificantly different from 0. Controlling for individual fixed 
effects, however, raises the MPE back to almost 2%, which is statistically indistinguishable 
from the MPE produced by OPROBIT. This implies that a 1% increase in pay per month 
increases  the  probability  of  individuals  reporting  to  be  either  “6”  or  “7”  on  the  job-
satisfaction scale by 4% in the more restrictive model compared to around 7–8% in the less 
restrictive models. However, since the sum of all MPEs should equal 0, we also see that a 1% 
increase in pay per month significantly reduces the probability of individuals reporting to be 
“neither satisfied or dissatisfied” with work (or “4”) and the low-satisfaction (those reporting 
to be “1”, “2”, or “3”) group. 
                                                           
7 The rest of the MPEs can be supplied upon request. 14 
 
There is almost a reversal in the pattern of MPE in the hours worked per week; as 
illustrated in Figure 2A, a 1% increase in the number of hours worked per week reduces the 
probability  of  individuals  reporting  to  be  “6”  on  the  job-satisfaction  scale  by  5%  in  the 
OPROBIT model, and around 9% in the generalized ordered probit models. Pooling the “6” 
and “7” job-satisfaction scales, a 1% increase in the number of hours worked lowers the 
probability of individuals reporting to be in these two categories by 11% in the OPROBIT 
model and 13–14% in the generalized models. 
With respect to the MPE of promotional opportunity (Figure 2C), a move from 0 to 1 
increases the probability of individuals reporting to be “very satisfied” with their jobs by 
approximately 6% in the OPROBIT model and slightly less than 4% in all three generalized 
models. The difference of around 2%, which is statistically significant at conventional levels, 
implies that there is a possible overestimation of the impact of promotional opportunity on 
overall  job  satisfaction  when  the  standard  ordered  probit  is  used  to  estimate  the  job-
satisfaction equation.  
Figures  2D–F  report  the  MPEs  for  the  dummy  variables  representing  commuting 
time: 61–90 minutes, union membership, and employer runs a pension scheme, respectively. 
Here, like the previous three job attributes, the slope heterogeneity in job satisfaction is also 
clear.  For  instance,  the  OPROBIT’s  MPE  of  commuting  time  of  61–90  minutes  on 
individuals  reporting  to  be  “very  satisfied”  with  their  jobs  is  −4%  and  is  statistically 
significant at the 5% level. However, the effect becomes statistically insignificantly different 
from 0 when we allow for both slope and individual heterogeneity in the job-satisfaction 
equation,  i.e.,  the  RE-GOPROBIT-ML  model.  The  same  can  also  be  said  for  the  union 
membership and pension scheme. 
MPEs can also be presented in their normalized forms. Table 4 does this by dividing 
the estimated MPEs obtained in Figures 2A-2G by the baseline job satisfaction distribution 15 
 
reported in Figure 1. For instance, a 1% increase in the monthly income raises the probability 
of individuals reporting to be “very satisfied” by 2.2% in the standard model. Consider that 
around 13.4% of people fall within this group, the normalized MPE of monthly income for 
the  “very  satisfied”  group  is  therefore % . ) . / . ( 1 16 100 4 13 2 2    .  In  other  words,  a  1% 
increase in the monthly income results in an increase in the proportion of people reporting to 
be “very satisfied” with their job from 13.4% to 15.6%, which is equivalent to a 16.1% 
increase from the baseline level, holding other things constant.  
MPEs can also be presented in their normalized forms. Table 4 does this by dividing 
the estimated MPEs obtained in Figures 2A–G by the baseline job-satisfaction distribution 
reported in Figure 1. For instance, a 1% increase in the monthly income raises the probability 
of individuals reporting to be “very satisfied” by 2.2% in the standard model. Considering 
that around 13.4% of people fall within this group, the normalized MPE of monthly income 
for the “very satisfied” group is therefore  % . ) . / . ( 1 16 100 4 13 2 2    . In other words, a 1% 
increase in the monthly income results in an increase in the proportion of people reporting to 
be “very satisfied” with their jobs from 13.4% to 15.6%, which is equivalent to a 16.1% 
increase from the baseline level, holding other things constant.  
By normalizing the MPEs, we now obtain evidence of slope heterogeneity that is 
much more visible than previously. For example, in the standard model, a 1% increase in the 
monthly income reduces the probability of people reporting “1” on the job-satisfaction scale 
from 1.7% to 1.4%, i.e., a drop of 22% from the baseline level. The generalized models, 
however, produce a percentage change that is roughly twice as large (i.e., a drop of around 
40–48% from 1.7% to 1%). With respect to promotional opportunity, a move from 0 to 1 in 
the promotional-opportunity dummy corresponds to an approximately 40% increase from the 
baseline level in the proportion of people reporting to be “very satisfied” with their jobs in the 
standard  ordered  probit  model.  This  figure  decreases  to  around  27.1%  in  the  RE-16 
 
GOPROBIT-ML  model.  In  short,  slope  heterogeneity  matters  in  the  estimation  of  job 
satisfaction. 
The relationship between the MPEs of different job attributes at various parts of the 
overall job-satisfaction distribution can also be illustrated by trade-off ratios. For illustrative 
purposes, we present the following three scenarios of trade-off ratios in Figures 3A–C: 
1)  log of hours worked per week/log of pay per month, 
2)  promotional opportunity/log of hours worked per week, and 
3)  promotional opportunity/log of hours worked per week. 
We normalize all MPEs to have positive values so that the trade-off ratios range from 0 to . 
With this transformation, Figure 3A is equivalent to showing how much additional pay per 
month is required to compensate for a 1% increase in the number of hours worked per week; 
Figure  3B  illustrates  how  much  additional  p ay  per  month  is  equivalent  to  having  a 
promotional opportunity at the workplace; and Figure 3C shows how much hours worked per 
week  must  be  reduced  to  compensate  for  having  no  promotional  opportunity  at  the 
workplace, holding the job-satisfaction distribution fixed.  
In order to offset a 1% increase in the number of hours worked per week, pay per 
month must go up by approximately 2.6% in the OPROBIT model. By construction, the 2.6% 
trade-off ratio is the same for all levels of job satisfaction when the equation is estimated 
using the standard model. In the generalized models, the income change varies from 1.4% to 
20.4% in the GOPROBIT; from 1.4% to 6.9% in the RE-GOPROBIT; and from 1.4% to 
2.7% in the RE-GOPROBIT-ML. The latter result is  particularly interesting as it implies 
almost  zero  differences  in  the  estimated  trade-offs  between  the  standard  model  and  the 
generalized  model  with  Mundlak  transformations.  In  other  words,  the  ratio  between the 
effects of income and hours worked is likely to be constant across the distribution of job 
satisfaction in equations where individual fixed effects are controlled for. One explanation for 17 
 
this is that, while income in the generalized model compared to the standard model affects 
much more those who reported “6” on the job-satisfaction scale, hours worked has the same 
greater effect for the same score on the same models.  
We  could  also  use  the  above  principle  to  calculate  the  monetary  value  of  a 
promotional  opportunity  in  the  workplace.  According  to  Figure  3B,  the  standard  model 
suggests that an additional pay of around 2.4% is equivalent to a move from 0 to 1 in the 
“promotional  opportunity”  dummy  for  all  levels  of  job-satisfaction  distribution.  In  the 
generalized models, the monetary values range from 1.3% to 24% in the GOPROBIT; from 
1% to 7.6% in the RE-GOPROBIT; and from 1% to 2.1% in the RE-GOPROBIT-ML. The 
latter, again, is not so dissimilar to the estimated trade-off obtained in the standard model. 
Finally, Figure 3C presents the calculated estimates of how much hours worked must 
be reduced – instead of a rise in pay – in order to “just” offset an average employee from 
working with no promotional opportunity. We can see that, with the standard model, hours 
worked  must  be  reduced  by  approximately  0.9%  in  order  to  compensate  for  having  no 
promotional opportunity at the workplace. The equivalent figure ranges from 0.6% to 1.2% in 




This paper follows Boes and Winkelmann (2010) and uses data from the BHPS (Waves 1–
18)  to  study  the  potential  implications  of  slope  heterogeneity  in  the  job-satisfaction 
distribution  on  employer–employee  relations.  By  allowing  the  correlations  between  job 
characteristics and job satisfaction to vary flexibly across the job-satisfaction scale, we are 
able to show that moderate-to-considerable slope heterogeneity exists among the studied job 
attributes – namely monthly salary, hours worked per week, promotional opportunity, time 18 
 
spent commuting to work, union membership, and jobs that include a pension scheme. For 
instance,  log  of  monthly  salary  has  a  higher  (absolute)  marginal  effect  on  raising  the 
probability of people reporting to be “highly satisfied” (i.e., reporting “6” or “7” on the job-
satisfaction scale) in the generalized model (7–8%) than in the standard model (4%); while a 
1% decrease in the hours worked per week has a relatively higher impact on reducing the 
probability of people reporting to be “highly satisfied” in the generalized model (13–14%) 
than in the standard model (11%).  
Faced with a relatively inflexible budget in which wages may be fixed in the short-
run, our results from the generalized ordered probit models suggest that more efficient ways 
of generating either “highly” or “very” satisfied workers, without placing too much strain on 
the available resources, may by and large exist. An employment package that offers a better 
work–life balance or options for flexible working conditions, all other things being constant, 
appears to be the most efficient way of increasing the incidence of highly satisfied workers 
and lowering the incidence of very dissatisfied workers. In the long-run, where wages are 
fully adjustable, employees may be offered options in which they could trade a fraction of 
their wage increases for more flexible working hours (or other perks) based on the trade-off 
parameters required to produce the “highly” or “very” satisfied workers in the generalized 
models. 
  We  began  by  noting  a  potentially  significant  ordinal  effect  of  job  satisfaction  on 
objective  economic  behaviours  such  as  quits  and  performances,  and  that  there  may  be 
incentives for employers to try and maximise the incidence of “highly” or “very” satisfied 
workers. The above results seem to suggest that, when slope heterogeneity in job satisfaction 
has been taken into account in the analysis, more efficient ways to achieve this may exist. 
Although  our  results  should  be  viewed  as  illustrative  (for  one,  the  issue  of  income 
endogeneity is not satisfactorily dealt  with in this paper),  they call for more  generalized 19 
 
models of ordered probit (or logit) to be incorporated in the analysis of job satisfaction in the 
future. 
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Figure 1: The distribution of overall job satisfaction among workers in the private 
sector and the self-employed, BHPS 1991-2009 
 
 
Note: N = 76,053. The responses to the overall job satisfaction question range from 1 “very dissatisfied” to 7 




































Table 1: Standard ordered probit and generalized ordered probit job satisfaction 
equations 
Dependent variable: 
Overall job satisfaction  OPROBIT     
GOPROBIT 
   
1    2    3    4    5    6   
Log of real pay per month  0.107**  0.216**  0.206**  0.177**  0.199**  0.148**  0.00757 
 
[0.0142]  [0.0352]  [0.0251]  [0.0198]  [0.0182]  [0.0170]  [0.0205] 
Job tenure  -0.00394  0.0117  -0.0108  -0.0179*  -0.0130*  -0.000970  0.000167 
 
[0.00491]  [0.0136]  [0.00982]  [0.00764]  [0.00655]  [0.00574]  [0.00706] 
Job tenure^2  -0.000498  -0.000114  0.000891  0.000787  0.000393  -0.00076+  -0.0013** 
 
[0.000336]  [0.000938]  [0.000674]  [0.000523]  [0.000451]  [0.000394]  [0.000488] 
Job size: 10-49 people  -0.148**  -0.0384  -0.0387  -0.0687**  -0.102**  -0.157**  -0.176** 
 
[0.0163]  [0.0388]  [0.0280]  [0.0227]  [0.0206]  [0.0190]  [0.0216] 
Job size 2: 50-499  -0.288**  -0.182**  -0.186**  -0.203**  -0.236**  -0.298**  -0.332** 
 
[0.0174]  [0.0397]  [0.0289]  [0.0235]  [0.0220]  [0.0206]  [0.0240] 
Job size 3: 500+  -0.282**  -0.202**  -0.252**  -0.205**  -0.244**  -0.291**  -0.312** 
 
[0.0225]  [0.0521]  [0.0389]  [0.0317]  [0.0291]  [0.0271]  [0.0327] 
Pension scheme  -0.0542**  -0.00103  -0.0461+  -0.0639**  -0.0516**  -0.0480**  -0.0703** 
 
[0.0137]  [0.0327]  [0.0240]  [0.0191]  [0.0176]  [0.0163]  [0.0201] 
Union member  -0.0735**  -0.0447  -0.0693+  -0.131**  -0.126**  -0.0956**  -0.00207 
 
[0.0215]  [0.0557]  [0.0400]  [0.0321]  [0.0290]  [0.0273]  [0.0348] 
Promotion opportunity  0.263**  0.359**  0.360**  0.345**  0.335**  0.262**  0.180** 
 
[0.0118]  [0.0293]  [0.0211]  [0.0167]  [0.0152]  [0.0141]  [0.0181] 
Permanent job  0.203**  0.0744  0.156**  0.176**  0.192**  0.208**  0.166** 
 
[0.0201]  [0.0495]  [0.0351]  [0.0277]  [0.0252]  [0.0230]  [0.0291] 
Commute: 16-30 minutes  -0.0582**  -0.0218  -0.0506*  -0.0565**  -0.0600**  -0.0659**  -0.0525** 
 
[0.0130]  [0.0310]  [0.0223]  [0.0181]  [0.0166]  [0.0156]  [0.0189] 
Commute:31-60 minutes  -0.0837**  -0.00818  -0.0485+  -0.0830**  -0.0856**  -0.0940**  -0.0905** 
 
[0.0166]  [0.0395]  [0.0286]  [0.0230]  [0.0219]  [0.0205]  [0.0256] 
Commute: 61-90 minutes  -0.205**  -0.151+  -0.171**  -0.234**  -0.215**  -0.228**  -0.209** 
 
[0.0350]  [0.0790]  [0.0608]  [0.0518]  [0.0464]  [0.0441]  [0.0575] 
Commute: 91+ minutes  -0.0319  0.199  -0.0751  -0.149*  -0.170**  -0.0418  0.0753 
 
[0.0540]  [0.167]  [0.0892]  [0.0704]  [0.0640]  [0.0602]  [0.0860] 
log of hours worked pw  -0.281**  -0.354**  -0.400**  -0.375**  -0.366**  -0.309**  -0.155** 
 
[0.0191]  [0.0508]  [0.0355]  [0.0275]  [0.0244]  [0.0222]  [0.0262] 
Self-employed  0.0509  -0.125  0.00135  -0.0145  0.0249  0.0517  0.126 
 
[0.0651]  [0.179]  [0.131]  [0.101]  [0.0860]  [0.0762]  [0.0926] 
Inverse Mill's ratio  0.253**  0.149*  0.153**  0.196**  0.207**  0.230**  0.321** 
 
[0.0293]  [0.0669]  [0.0490]  [0.0400]  [0.0362]  [0.0334]  [0.0375] 
Log likelihood  -112381.2        -110408          
 
Note: +<10%; *<5%; **<1%. N=76,053. Standard errors are in parentheses. Reference groups are: job size: 1-9 
people and commute: 0-15 minutes. Control variables include: age, age-squared, gender, health status, marital 
status, education, race dummies (3), occupational sector dummies (35), regional dummies (19), and wave 
dummies (18). 24 
 
Table 2: Generalized ordered probit job satisfaction equation with random effects 
Dependent variable: Overall 
job satisfaction     
RE-GOPROBIT 
   
1    2    3    4    5    6   
Log of real pay per month  0.264**  0.261**  0.232**  0.261**  0.203**  0.0313+ 
 
[0.0364]  [0.0261]  [0.0203]  [0.0178]  [0.0158]  [0.0190] 
Job tenure  0.0208  -0.00500  -0.0131  -0.00785  0.00855  0.0187* 
 
[0.0154]  [0.0112]  [0.00865]  [0.00746]  [0.00644]  [0.00803] 
Job tenure^2  -0.00058  0.00045  0.00022  -0.00030  -0.0020**  -0.0035** 
 
[0.00106]  [0.000763]  [0.000589]  [0.000508]  [0.000440]  [0.000552] 
Job size: 10-49 people  -0.0400  -0.0458  -0.0831**  -0.125**  -0.188**  -0.197** 
 
[0.0402]  [0.0293]  [0.0226]  [0.0198]  [0.0173]  [0.0206] 
Job size 2: 50-499  -0.156**  -0.176**  -0.200**  -0.245**  -0.321**  -0.345** 
 
[0.0418]  [0.0302]  [0.0235]  [0.0209]  [0.0186]  [0.0232] 
Job size 3: 500+  -0.167**  -0.237**  -0.187**  -0.238**  -0.297**  -0.309** 
 
[0.0539]  [0.0386]  [0.0303]  [0.0269]  [0.0241]  [0.0312] 
Pension scheme  0.0476  -0.00425  -0.0316  -0.0217  -0.0241  -0.0667** 
 
[0.0344]  [0.0251]  [0.0194]  [0.0171]  [0.0151]  [0.0193] 
Union member  0.0241  -0.0167  -0.110**  -0.119**  -0.109**  -0.0239 
 
[0.0566]  [0.0400]  [0.0307]  [0.0270]  [0.0242]  [0.0337] 
Promotion opportunity  0.388**  0.398**  0.393**  0.389**  0.316**  0.235** 
 
[0.0322]  [0.0224]  [0.0170]  [0.0149]  [0.0132]  [0.0173] 
Permanent job  0.0648  0.162**  0.189**  0.201**  0.207**  0.138** 
 
[0.0540]  [0.0392]  [0.0311]  [0.0274]  [0.0250]  [0.0318] 
Commute: 16-30 minutes  0.0183  -0.0146  -0.0244  -0.0312*  -0.0407**  -0.0197 
 
[0.0317]  [0.0229]  [0.0180]  [0.0159]  [0.0142]  [0.0181] 
Commute:31-60 minutes  0.0319  -0.0121  -0.0582*  -0.0670**  -0.0841**  -0.0618* 
 
[0.0420]  [0.0300]  [0.0232]  [0.0206]  [0.0185]  [0.0245] 
Commute: 61-90 minutes  -0.0935  -0.113+  -0.202**  -0.183**  -0.207**  -0.183** 
 
[0.0885]  [0.0624]  [0.0467]  [0.0422]  [0.0383]  [0.0566] 
Commute: 91+ minutes  0.242  -0.120  -0.196**  -0.222**  -0.0560  0.104 
 
[0.205]  [0.104]  [0.0760]  [0.0672]  [0.0606]  [0.0782] 
log of hours worked pw  -0.426**  -0.496**  -0.475**  -0.470**  -0.406**  -0.217** 
 
[0.0492]  [0.0358]  [0.0277]  [0.0241]  [0.0211]  [0.0244] 
Self-employed  -0.138  -0.00361  -0.0266  0.0389  0.0750  0.152 
 
[0.198]  [0.151]  [0.115]  [0.101]  [0.0861]  [0.105] 
Inverse Mill's ratio  0.129+  0.125*  0.175**  0.184**  0.212**  0.321** 
   [0.0702]  [0.0520]  [0.0413]  [0.0362]  [0.0322]  [0.0378] 
 
Note: N=76,053. Log likelihood = -104329.27. Also see Table 1. 25 
 
Table 3: Generalized ordered probit job satisfaction equation with random effects and 
Mundlak transformations 
Dependent variable: Overall 
job satisfaction     
RE-GOPROBIT-ML 
   
1    2    3    4    5    6   
Current job characteristics                   
Log of real pay per month  0.237**  0.256**  0.251**  0.285**  0.238**  0.113** 
 
[0.0485]  [0.0332]  [0.0258]  [0.0222]  [0.0193]  [0.0240] 
Job tenure  0.0276  0.00213  -0.00642  8.35e-05  0.0118+  0.0148+ 
 
[0.0171]  [0.0122]  [0.00930]  [0.00795]  [0.00682]  [0.0086] 
Job tenure^2  -0.0018  -0.00077  -0.0009  -0.0013*  -0.003**  -0.003** 
 
[0.00117]  [0.0008]  [0.00063]  [0.00054]  [0.00046]  [0.0005] 
Job size: 10-49 people  -0.0309  -0.0592+  -0.090**  -0.127**  -0.159**  -0.160** 
 
[0.0503]  [0.0359]  [0.0273]  [0.0235]  [0.0203]  [0.0253] 
Job size 2: 50-499  -0.135*  -0.134**  -0.157**  -0.209**  -0.255**  -0.275** 
 
[0.0530]  [0.0377]  [0.0291]  [0.0253]  [0.0223]  [0.0294] 
Job size 3: 500+  -0.0714  -0.143**  -0.148**  -0.184**  -0.211**  -0.232** 
 
[0.0681]  [0.0484]  [0.0373]  [0.0326]  [0.0288]  [0.0395] 
Pension scheme  0.0320  -0.0363  -0.0158  0.00576  -0.00727  -0.0306 
 
[0.0416]  [0.0303]  [0.0230]  [0.0199]  [0.0174]  [0.0229] 
Union member  -0.0395  -0.0460  -0.123**  -0.125**  -0.096**  -0.0646 
 
[0.0701]  [0.0498]  [0.0375]  [0.0326]  [0.0287]  [0.0412] 
Promotion opportunity  0.446**  0.431**  0.430**  0.391**  0.303**  0.230** 
 
[0.0381]  [0.0263]  [0.0196]  [0.0170]  [0.0149]  [0.0203] 
Permanent job  0.0753  0.142**  0.134**  0.156**  0.184**  0.0421 
 
[0.0658]  [0.0468]  [0.0366]  [0.0322]  [0.0291]  [0.0381] 
Commute: 16-30 minutes  0.0134  -0.0398  -0.0200  -0.0183  -0.00665  0.0260 
 
[0.0394]  [0.0283]  [0.0218]  [0.0190]  [0.0167]  [0.0223] 
Commute:31-60 minutes  0.0252  0.0103  -0.0392  -0.0491+  -0.0305  0.0155 
 
[0.0538]  [0.0382]  [0.0289]  [0.0252]  [0.0223]  [0.0305] 
Commute: 61-90 minutes  -0.135  -0.0476  -0.194**  -0.175**  -0.157**  -0.0998 
 
[0.111]  [0.0760]  [0.0557]  [0.0492]  [0.0438]  [0.0664] 
Commute: 91+ minutes  0.508*  -0.00434  -0.128  -0.194*  -0.0463  -0.00314 
 
[0.247]  [0.120]  [0.0891]  [0.0776]  [0.0685]  [0.0925] 
log of hours worked pw  -0.391**  -0.502**  -0.500**  -0.495**  -0.422**  -0.303** 
 
[0.0648]  [0.0459]  [0.0351]  [0.0301]  [0.0259]  [0.0314] 
Self-employed  -0.0985  0.0381  0.0328  0.0202  0.0678  0.160 
 
[0.202]  [0.154]  [0.118]  [0.103]  [0.0873]  [0.106] 
Within person averages 
            Log of real pay per month  0.0167  -0.0273  -0.0770*  -0.085**  -0.092**  -0.171** 
 
[0.0638]  [0.0450]  [0.0359]  [0.0321]  [0.0288]  [0.0343] 
Job tenure  -0.0740+  -0.083**  -0.082**  -0.087**  -0.059**  -0.0164 
 
[0.0428]  [0.0319]  [0.0262]  [0.0239]  [0.0220]  [0.0259] 
Job tenure^2  0.0099**  0.010**  0.0098**  0.0096**  0.0068**  0.00201 
 
[0.00296]  [0.0022]  [0.00182]  [0.00166]  [0.00153]  [0.0018] 26 
 
Job size: 10-49 people  0.303**  0.278**  0.130+  0.164*  0.259**  0.226** 
 
[0.114]  [0.0879]  [0.0716]  [0.0651]  [0.0598]  [0.0727] 
Job size 2: 50-499  0.269**  0.310**  0.145*  0.164**  0.166**  0.128* 
 
[0.0984]  [0.0772]  [0.0628]  [0.0569]  [0.0524]  [0.0652] 
Job size 3: 500+  0.0941*  0.0541  -0.0128  0.0152  0.0207  0.00852 
 
[0.0456]  [0.0355]  [0.0292]  [0.0267]  [0.0248]  [0.0312] 
Pension scheme  -0.0486  -0.00883  -0.128*  -0.149**  -0.0950*  -0.131** 
 
[0.0857]  [0.0641]  [0.0517]  [0.0469]  [0.0428]  [0.0503] 
Union member  -0.115  -0.0471  -0.0518  -0.0471  -0.0199  -0.158* 
 
[0.122]  [0.0893]  [0.0716]  [0.0650]  [0.0598]  [0.0744] 
Promotion opportunity  0.160*  0.0828  0.103*  -0.0148  -0.0678+  -0.0237 
 
[0.0763]  [0.0566]  [0.0453]  [0.0412]  [0.0378]  [0.0454] 
Permanent job  -0.0651  0.0434  0.142*  0.124*  0.0750  0.303** 
 
[0.113]  [0.0819]  [0.0677]  [0.0614]  [0.0563]  [0.0689] 
Commute: 16-30 minutes  -0.101  0.177  -0.00727  0.0320  0.156  0.300* 
 
[0.241]  [0.176]  [0.144]  [0.134]  [0.123]  [0.153] 
Commute:31-60 minutes  -0.112  0.242  -0.0450  -0.0347  0.0353  0.155 
 
[0.243]  [0.177]  [0.145]  [0.134]  [0.123]  [0.154] 
Commute: 61-90 minutes  -0.0611  0.0397  -0.0455  -0.0264  -0.0114  0.0265 
 
[0.128]  [0.0926]  [0.0758]  [0.0704]  [0.0647]  [0.0805] 
Commute: 91+ minutes  -0.789+  -0.0369  -0.122  -0.0182  0.217  0.737** 
 
[0.456]  [0.312]  [0.260]  [0.240]  [0.222]  [0.262] 
log of hours worked pw  -0.00617  0.0638  0.107*  0.0946*  0.0670  0.174** 
 
[0.0930]  [0.0672]  [0.0528]  [0.0470]  [0.0421]  [0.0487] 
Self-employed  -0.0409  -0.0401  -0.0699  0.126  0.0799  0.00769 
 
[0.156]  [0.118]  [0.0998]  [0.0913]  [0.0837]  [0.0964] 
Inverse Mill's ratio  0.163*  0.169**  0.201**  0.200**  0.219**  0.304** 
   [0.0715]  [0.0520]  [0.0414]  [0.0363]  [0.0323]  [0.0379] 
 
Note: N=76,053. Log likelihood = -103992.11. See Table 1.27 
 
Figures 2A-2F: Marginal probability effects of job characteristics on job satisfaction 
 
Figure 2A: log of pay per month 
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Figure 2C: promotional opportunity* 
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Figure 2E: union membership* 
 
Figure 2F: employer runs a pension scheme* 
Note: * denotes the marginal probability effect of a dummy variable. 4-standard-error bars (two above, two 
below), i.e., 95% confidence interval.  
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Table 4: Normalized Marginal Probability Effects (or MPEs as a % Change) 
     
Job satisfaction 
    Normalized MPEs  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Log of pay per month 
              OPROBIT  -21.7%  -18.4%  -15.2%  -11.4%  -5.9%  4.6%  16.1% 
GOPROBIT  -41.2%  -35.5%  -21.7%  -25.5%  -2.3%  12.7%  1.1% 
REGOPROBIT  -48.4%  -36.8%  -22.4%  -26.2%  -3.6%  13.2%  3.6% 
REGOPROBIT-ML  -41.1%  -37.7%  -27.3%  -29.1%  -6.4%  12.8%  13.1% 
Log of hours worked per week 
              OPROBIT  56.9%  48.3%  39.8%  29.8%  15.5%  -12.0%  -42.2% 
GOPROBIT  67.6%  76.3%  50.4%  36.7%  10.5%  -20.5%  -22.3% 
REGOPROBIT  67.6%  76.3%  50.4%  36.7%  10.5%  -20.5%  -22.3% 
REGOPROBIT-ML  67.7%  81.8%  55.1%  40.0%  12.3%  -19.1%  -35.3% 
Promotional opportunity 
              OPROBIT  -52.0%  -44.3%  -36.7%  -27.7%  -14.7%  10.9%  40.2% 
GOPROBIT  -66.8%  -62.4%  -46.5%  -32.8%  -6.7%  15.1%  26.3% 
REGOPROBIT  -66.8%  -62.4%  -46.5%  -32.8%  -6.7%  15.1%  26.3% 
REGOPROBIT-ML  -75.3%  -57.1%  -46.6%  -25.6%  -5.9%  13.1%  27.1% 
Commuting time: 61-90 minutes 
              OPROBIT  51.4%  40.3%  31.2%  21.8%  9.7%  -10.0%  -27.3% 
GOPROBIT  34.0%  37.1%  47.3%  17.6%  12.5%  -12.4%  -26.6% 
REGOPROBIT  18.5%  19.7%  35.3%  11.2%  10.5%  -8.8%  -19.6% 
REGOPROBIT-ML  26.2%  -3.9%  40.7%  10.8%  4.6%  -7.8%  -11.1% 
Union membership 
              OPROBIT  15.8%  13.1%  10.6%  7.8%  3.9%  -3.3%  -10.7% 
GOPROBIT  8.9%  15.9%  28.3%  12.2%  1.3%  -8.4%  -0.3% 
REGOPROBIT  -4.3%  6.9%  23.4%  11.4%  3.6%  -6.9%  -2.8% 
REGOPROBIT-ML  7.0%  7.3%  23.0%  10.5%  1.4%  -4.6%  -7.3% 
Employer runs a pension scheme 
              OPROBIT  10.9%  9.3%  7.7%  5.8%  3.0%  -2.3%  -8.2% 
GOPROBIT  0.2%  13.3%  11.4%  2.9%  2.3%  -1.1%  -10.2% 
REGOPROBIT  -8.7%  6.4%  6.5%  0.1%  1.3%  0.7%  -7.8% 
REGOPROBIT-ML  -5.6%  12.2%  -0.4%  -4.1%  1.5%  0.6%  -3.6% 
 
Note: Normalized MPEs (or the percentage change in the job satisfaction distribution) are calculated by 
dividing the estimated MPE (Figures 2A-2F) by the proportion of people reporting to be in the corresponding 
job satisfaction category (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 3A: How much additional pay per month (in %) is required to compensate a 1% 





Figure 3B: How much additional pay per month (in %) is equivalent to having  
























































































































































Figure 3C: How much work hours per week (in %) has to be reduced to compensate 
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Table 1A: Descriptive Statistics 
Main variables  M  STD 
Job satisfaction  5.340  1.310 
Log of real pay per month  6.820  0.839 
Job tenure  10.280  4.615 
Job tenure^2  126.998  67.718 
Job size: 10-49 people  0.298  0.458 
Job size 2: 50-499  0.341  0.474 
Job size 3: 500+  0.132  0.339 
Pension scheme  0.545  0.498 
Union member  0.124  0.329 
Promotion opportunity  0.441  0.497 
Permanent job  0.939  0.239 
Commute: 16-30 minutes  0.284  0.451 
Commute:31-60 minutes  0.154  0.360 
Commute: 61-90 minutes  0.024  0.154 
Commute: 91+ minutes  0.008  0.008 
log of hours worked per week  3.445  0.487 
Self-employed  0.004  0.066 
 
Note: N=76,052.   34 
 
Table 2A: Heckman selection model (Probit) 
Selection into private/self-employment  β 
Age   0.205** 
 
[0.00361] 
Age-squared/100  -0.274** 
 
[0.00435] 
Health: Poor  0.563** 
 
[0.0365] 
Health: Fair  1.122** 
 
[0.0387] 
Health: Good  1.425** 
 
[0.0390] 
Health: Excellent  1.496** 
 
[0.0399] 
Completed high school  0.119** 
 
[0.0188] 
Completed university level  0.395** 
 
[0.0193] 
Ethnicity: Black Africans & Caribbean  -0.146* 
 
[0.0725] 
Ethnicity: Asians  -0.335** 
 
[0.0578] 
Ethnicity: Others  -0.232* 
 
[0.110] 
Cohabiting  0.0303 
 
[0.0231] 
Widowed  -0.135* 
 
[0.0574] 
Divorced  -0.0986* 
 
[0.0393] 
Separated  -0.0888* 
 
[0.0446] 
Never married  -0.237** 
 
[0.0335] 
Men  0.611** 
 
[0.0306] 
Spouse pay: less than £500 pm  0.299** 
 
[0.0743] 
Spouse pay: £500-£999 pm  0.197** 
 
[0.0491] 
Spouse pay: £1,000-£1,499 pm  0.246** 
 
[0.0459] 
Spouse pay: £1,500-£1,999 pm  0.112* 
 
[0.0470] 




Men x Spouse pay: less than £500 pm  0.0576 
 
[0.0854] 
Men x Spouse pay: £500-£999 pm  0.201** 
 
[0.0691] 
Men x Spouse pay: £1,000-£1,499 pm  0.147* 
 
[0.0732] 
Men x Spouse pay: £1,500-£1,999 pm  0.156+ 
 
[0.0890] 
Men x Spouse pay: £2,000+ pm  0.225* 
 
[0.0940] 
Spouse work hours: 16-29 hpw  0.148+ 
 
[0.0818] 
Spouse work hours: 30-39 hpw  0.273** 
 
[0.0443] 
Spouse work hours: 40+ hpw  0.270** 
 
[0.0421] 
Men x Spouse work hours: 16-29 hpw  0.0786 
 
[0.0936] 
Men x Spouse work hours: 30-39 hpw  -0.184** 
 
[0.0667] 
Men x Spouse work hours: 40+ hpw  -0.148* 
 
[0.0755] 
Rest of household's incomes  -0.0698** 
 
[0.00517] 
Number of children: Age 0-2  -0.543** 
 
[0.0159] 
Number of children: Age 3-4  -0.394** 
  [0.0153] 
Number of children: Age 5-11  -0.215** 
 
[0.00939] 
Number of children: Age 12-15  -0.112** 
 
[0.0111] 
Number of children: Age 16-18  -0.410** 
 
[0.0145] 
Shared ownership of household  -0.0755 
 
[0.0776] 
Rented household  -0.547** 
 
[0.0169] 
Rent free household  -0.153** 
 
[0.0462] 
Other kind of household ownership  -0.155+ 
 
[0.0846] 
Constant  -4.218** 
 
[0.108] 
Note: N = 194,107. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Additional controls include regional dummies 
(19) and wave dummies (18). 